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Sentencing a Defendant to Death:
Procedural Review of the Use of Testimony
from Compelled Psychiatric Examinations
In this casenote, the author critically examines the recent
decision of Smith v. Estelle, in which the Fifth Circuit used a
dual rationalefor vacating a death sentence. The court held
that Texas violated the defendant's due process rights by
producing a surprise psychiatric witness at sentencing. The
court held also that the defendant had a fifth amendment right
to refuse a court-compelled psychiatric examination because he
had not waived that right by raising an insanity defense.
Discussing this decision in the context of the constitutionality
of death sentencing procedures, the author argues that the
Supreme Court should uphold both the due process rationale
and the broader fifth amendment rationale.

On September 28, 1973, Ernest Benjamin Smith and an accomplice robbed a convenience store in Dallas, Texas, and fatally
shot the store clerk.' Apprehended shortly afterwards, Smith and
the accomplice were tried separately and each convicted of capital
murder.' The judge ordered an immediate sentence hearing after
Smith's conviction, to have the jury recommend life imprisonment
or death.8 Under the Texas death penalty statute, the jury determination turns principally on finding a probability that the defendant will continue to threaten society by committing future violent
crimes." At Smith's sentence hearing, on the basis of extremely
1. Smith's accomplice shot the clerk; Smith's gun was defective and could not fire.
2. Although Smith had not shot the clerk, the state prosecuted both him and his accomplice as principals for capital murder. Smith v. State, 540 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Crim. App.
1976).
3. In the sentence hearing, the jury must consider:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the
death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing
the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased.
(e) If the jury returns an affirmative finding on each issue submitted under this
article, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. ...
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b), (e) (Vernon Supp. 1980).

4. Id. § (b)(2). Having convicted Smith for capital murder, the jury would almost certainly have to answer the questions in (b)(1) and (b)(3) affirmatively.
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damaging testimony by the state's sole witness, psychiatrist James
P. Grigson, the jury voted for the death penalty. Dr. Grigson appeared for the prosecution as a surprise witness. Before the trial
the judge had instructed the state prosecutor to have Mr. Grigson
examine Smith to determine his competency to stand trial. The
court never notified Smith's attorney that it had ordered the examination,' and the prosecution failed to include Dr. Grigson's
name on a witness list supplied to the defense during discovery.
At the penalty hearing the state presented no witnesses and rested,
subject to reopening;8 the defense offered three lay witnesses.9
When the defense rested and could call no further witnesses, the
prosecution then called Dr. Grigson to testify that Smith was a
dangerous sociopath who would certainly commit further acts of
violence. The testimony convinced the jurors that Smith would
constitute a continuing threat to society, and consequently they
sentenced him to death.' 0 After Smith exhausted his state remedies in an unsuccessful challenge of the Texas death penalty statute, the Supreme Court of the United States declined to review the
case." Smith then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, complaining that the use of the psychiatric testimony had violated his
right under the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments. The district court vacated the death sentence, and the court of appeals
unanimously held, affirmed: A court may not compel a defendant
"to speak to a psychiatrist who can use his statements against him
5. Judge Scales, the Texas judge who heard Smith's case, testified in federal district
court that he regularly ordered a mental examination of a defendant in a capital trial to
determine his competency to stand trial. Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647, 651 (N.D. Tex.
1977).
6. Judge Scales normally notified defense counsel when he ordered an examination, but
inexplicably in this case he gave no notification, formal or otherwise. Dr. Grigson did not file
a written report of evaluation. He merely sent Judge Scales a letter summarizing his findings. Only after the jury had been selected did the defense discover a copy of the letter,
while reviewing court files. Since the defense attorneys had not raised the issue of competency, they reasonably concluded that Dr. Grigson would not testify. Id. at 651-52.
7. Since the prosecution had notified Dr. Grigson before the trial that it intended to
call him as a witness, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the prosecution had intentionally
omitted Dr. Grigson's name from the witness list it gave the defense. Smith v. Estelle, 602
F.2d 694, 702 (5th Cir. 1979).
8. Id. at 696.
9. The three witnesses were Smith's stepmother, his aunt, and the owner of the gun
used in the robbery. Id.
10. The court informed the jury that Dr. Grigson was a court-appointed psychiatrist
but did not explain that the appointment was only to determine Smith's competence to
stand trial. Dr. Grigson was the state's only witness. Id. at 697.
11. Id., cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977) (Brennan, Marshall, & White, JJ., dissenting).
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at the sentencing phase of a capital trial." Smith v. Estelle, 602
F.2d 694, 708 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1311 (1980).
The significance of Smith v. Estelle stems from its extension
of the procedural safeguards that limit the way in which state
courts may impose the death penalty. Smith defines the special
degree of due process to which a capital defendant is entitled at
sentencing; elaborating upon the line of analysis begun by the Su1 Smith, however, goes far bepreme Court in Gardnerv. Florida.
yond the due process rationale of Gardner. After examining the
unfairness of the state's use of psychiatric predictions of future
dangerousness based only on compelled examinations of competency," the Fifth Circuit, for the first time, explicitly acknowledged a capital defendant's fifth amendment right to refuse to
speak to a psychiatrist who could use his statements against him in
the sentencing phase of his trial.
During the seventies, the Supreme Court began formulating a
standard for reviewing challenges to the manner in which states
imposed the death penalty. One approach was to find state violations of the eighth amendment as incorporated by the fourteenth
amendment. In Furman v. Georgia," the Court found that several
states had meted out the death penalty arbitrarily and capriciously, and consequently held that those death penalty statutes
violated the ban of the eighth amendment against cruel and unusual punishment. Responding to Furman, many states enacted
death penalty statutes designed to remedy this defect. 15 In 1976,
the Supreme Court reviewed five such statutes"" to determine
whether they provided the high degree of fairness mandated by
Furman.1 7 The Court upheld three of these statutes: those of Flor12. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
13. 602 F.2d at 699 n.7, 703 n.13. See, e.g., Bruce v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051, 1054-56 (5th
Cir. 1976); Livingston v. State, 542 S.W.2d 655, 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Gholson v.
State, 542 S.W.2d 395, 400-01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Hurd v. State, 513 S.W.2d 936, 944
(Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Armstrong v. State, 502 S.W.2d 731, 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). In
all five cases, the prosecution used the results of competency examinations to show the defendant's future dangerousness.
14. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
15. By 1976, 35 states had enacted death penalty statutes designed to comply with
Furman. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 n.23 (1976); Black, Due Process for Death:
Jurek v. Texas and Companion Cases, 26 CATH. U.L. Rav. 1, 2 (1976).
16. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
17. The Court expressed two principal concerns: the need to compel the sentencing
judge or jury to focus on the particular circumstances of the defendant and the need to
avoid arbitrary imposition of the death sentence. In response to those concerns the Court
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ida and Georgia, as well as the Texas law under which the jury
convicted and sentenced Smith. 8 The Court concluded that these
statutes, at least facially, would "promote the evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition of death sentences under law."',
20 the Court reEight months later, in Gardner v. Florida,
viewed Florida's sentencing procedures rather than the death penalty statute itself. In deciding to sentence the defendant to death,
thus overriding the jury recommendation, the trial judge in Gardner had relied heavily on a presentence report that had been kept
secret from the defense attorney. 21 The Supreme Court overturned
the death sentence, but relied on considerations of due process,
rather than the eighth amendment.2 2 Weighing the state's interest
in keeping the report confidential28 against both the finality of the
death sentence and the fatal consequence of the defendant's inability to rebut the conclusions of the report, the Court held, that
the sentencing procedure was unconstitutionally unfair.
The approach in Gardner marked a new direction for the
Court.2 4 In its earlier eighth amendment analyses of post-Furman

death penalty statutes, 5 the Court had attempted to ensure that
state law permitted a judge or jury to impose the death sentence
only after weighing all relevant evidence in a fair and rational
manner. When in Gardner the judge's application of Florida law
clearly fell short of what the Court had envisioned in Proffitt v.
required: 1) that the judge or jury consider the character and record of the offender and the
circumstances of the offense; and 2) appellate review of the sentencing. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 333-35; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 257-59; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at
188-98.
18. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The Court struck down the mandatory death penalty statutes of North Carolina and Louisiana.
19. 428 U.S. at 276.
20. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
21. Id. at 353.
22. Id. at 362.
23. The state gave three reasons for witholding the report: the assurance of secrecy
made it easier to obtain confidential information about the defendant; disclosure caused
delays; and, if the defendant was not executed, confidentiality would prevent damage to his
rehabilitation. The Court disposed of these arguments easily, determining that: 1) in a death
penalty case the need for truth rather than rumor outweighed the state's interest in access
to information; 2) the time spent determining the truth was worth any resulting delay; 3)
the rehabilitation interest was specious if the defendant was sentenced to death. Finally, the
Court emphasized the critical importance of open debate between adversaries in the search
for truth in the criminal process. Id. at 358-62.
24. See 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 769 (1977); 63 VA. L. REv. 1281 (1977); 1977 WASH. U.L.Q.
728.
25. See, e.g., note 16'supra.
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Florida," the Justices faced a choice. They could either strike
down the Florida statute that they had only months before upheld,
or else embark on an examination of the sentencing process. They
took the latter course, choosing a due process balancing approach
to scrutinize the imposition of death sentences.97
In Smith v. Estelle, the Fifth Circuit applied the due process
balancing analysis of Gardner and concluded that Dr. Grigson's
surprise testimony was as damaging to Smith as the secret presentencing report had been to Gardner. 8 The court examined the
prosecution's reasons for failing to reveal that Dr. Grigson would
appear at trial and found them wanting. "[T]he gains from informality and relaxed procedures cannot possibly outweigh the risk
that the state may execute a person who would not have been sentenced to death if the jury had had full and 'accurate sentencing
information.' 29 The prosecution's surprise tactic was devastating
to the' defendant's interests. Smith's attorneys could offer no psychiatric testimony to rebut Dr. Grigson and countered his testimony only with unprepared cross-examination. The Fifth Circuit
emphasized that if defense counsel had had an opportunity to prepare, they could have successfully impeached the testimony.
To prove its point, the court itself impeached Dr. Grigson.30
Judge Goldberg pointed out that Dr. Grigson had made a virtual
career of appearing, as a psychiatric witness for the state of
Texas." The court quoted from a standard psychiatric textbook,
26. 428 U.S. 242.
27. "[I]t is now clear that the sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy

the requirements of the Due Process Clause." 430 U.S. at 358. Citing Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), the Court left open exactly what procedural protections would be
necessary to ensure that a death penalty sentencing hearing satisfies the requirements of the
due process clause. 430 U.S. at 358 n.9. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the
Supreme Court indicated that due process analysis requires the balancing of three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,

and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
Id. at 335.
28. 602 F.2d at 698-99, 701, 703.
29. Id. at 702 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 190). The court found that the
prosecution had no reasons for the surprise. Id.

30. Id. at 699 n.7.
31. The court cited the numerous times Dr. Grigson had testified for the state in re-

ported appellate cases and had declared a defendant a sociopath, or someone likely to commit crimes in the future, even though Grigson had examined the defendant only for competency or sanity. Grigson had never appeared as a witness for the defense in reported cases.
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asserting that it would be medically impossible to support conclusions of the sort Dr. Grigson drew, solely on the basis of a ninetyminute examination for competency.3 2 Finally, the opinion cited
numerous authorities, including the American Psychiatric Association, who maintain that psychiatric examinations of the future
dangerousness of a criminal are notoriously unreliable." Relying
on the principles set out in Gardner,the Fifth Circuit held that by
concealing its plan to call Grigson to testify, the prosecution had
prevented the defense from effectively presenting to the jury evidence that was relevant, available, and important, thereby depriv34
ing Smith of the process that was due him.
Although the issue of due process alone was dispositive in
Smith's case, the court was sensitive to the fifth amendment

problems raised by the use and abuse of "future dangerousness"
testimony drawn from compelled psychiatric examinations in
Texas capital trials.3 5 In squarely confronting these constitutional
issues"' the Fifth Circuit ventured into a relatively undeveloped
area of the law.37 The use of psychiatric testimony based on compelled psychiatric examinations has spurred several recent constitutional challenges.3 8 All of those challenges, however, involved
Id. at 699 n.7.
32. "Moreover, Dr. Grigson reached his conclusions entirely... on the basis of a single
ninety minute 'mental status examination' of the defendant . . . . One standard textbook
flatly asserts that it is medically impossible to draw such conclusions on the basis of a
mental status examination." Id. (citing Sands, Psychiatric History and Mental Status, in
COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY 499 (A. Freedman & H. Kaplan eds. 1977)).
33. The American Psychiatric Association filed an amicus brief in Smith complaining
that Dr. Grigson's inquiry about future violence does not involve medical analysis and is not
within the realm of established psychiatric expertise. 602 F.2d at 699 n.7; see Dix, The
Death Penalty, "Dangerousness",Psychiatric Testimony and Professional Ethics, 5 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 151 (1977); Black, supra note 15.
34. Quoting from Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977), the Fifth Circuit found
that the surprise testimony had foreclosed "that debate between adversaries [that] is often
essential to the truth-seeking function of trials." 602 F.2d at 699.
The Supreme Court had expressed similar concerns when it overturned the death penalty statute in Woodson v. North Carolina."[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different
from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. . . . Because of that qualitative difference,
there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that
death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
35. See note 13 supra.
36. The court noted that if it overturned the death sentence simply on the basis of the
surprise testimony, the state would probably try Smith again using the same evidence, and
another federal collateral proceeding raising the same fifth and sixth amendment issues
would be "inevitable." 602 F.2d at 703 n.13.
37. Defendants have not raised fifth amendment challenges in the context of psychiatric testimony on the issue of their future dangerousness.
38. See Aronson, Should the Privilege Against Self-IncriminationApply to Compelled
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competency or sanity questions raised before or during a criminal
trial before the sentencing stage. Although the pyschiatric evidence
in Smith related only to sentencing, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the
acquisition and use of Smith's compelled psychiatric testimony to
bring it within the scope of traditional fifth amendment
guarantees.
In the past, psychiatric testimony has most often served two
functions in-criminal trials: 1) to establish the defendant's competency to stand trial; and 2) to establish the defendant's sanity at
the time he committed the crime. Most circuits have held that
once a defendant places his competency or sanity at issue and introduces psychiatric testimony to prove that defense, he has no
right to refuse an examination by a psychiatrist chosen by the
prosecution. 0 In the last fifteen years a number of defendants
have claimed that this rule violates their fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination by requiring them to supply potentially
harmful evidence to the prosecution.40 In practically all cases involving competency or sanity, those challenges have failed."
The circuit courts have denied the fifth amendment challenges
under two theories. The first rests on a distinction between real or
physical evidence and testimonial evidence. Real or physical evidence, such as handwriting exemplars, 2 voice prints,"' and blood
samples," comprises the defendant's physical attributes and thus,
Psychiatric Examinations?26 STAN. L. REv. 55 (1973); Comment, Miranda on the Couch:
An Approach to Problems of Self-Incrimination, Right to Counsel, and Miranda Warnings
in Pre-Trial Psychiatric Examinations of Criminal Defendants, 11 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROB. 403 (1975); Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government Psychiatric Examination:An Invasion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,83 HARv. L.
REV. 648 (1970).
39. See United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855
(1976); United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Trapnell,
495 F.2d 22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 851 (1974); United States v. Malcolm, 475 F.2d
420 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Baird, 414 F.2d 700 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1005 (1970); United States v. Albright,
388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968); Alexander v. United States, 380 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967); Pope
v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967), vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651
(1968).
40. See Note, supra note 38.
41. See cases cited note 39 supra.
42. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting sample not protected by the
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination).
43. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (compelled production of voice exemplars not violative of fifth amendment right against self-incrimination).
44. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Writing for the majority in that case,
Justice Brennan remarked, "We hold that the privilege protects an accused only from being
compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the state with evidence of a testi-
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unlike his statements about the commission of a crime, does not
fall within the protection of the fifth amendment. 45 Several courts
have characterized the results of psychiatric examinations to determine competency or sanity as real or physical evidence. 4" That
characterization springs from the conclusion that the psychiatrist
bases his diagnosis only on physical elements: the defendant's
manner, his attention span, or the patterns of his speech or
thought.47 These elements speak to the defendant's mental capacity either to stand trial or to have performed the crime, but do not
constitute inculpatory statements. The fifth amendment protects
the latter but not the former.
The second and most common basis for denying the fifth
amendment challenge, the waiver or estoppel theory, acknowledges
the existence of a right but finds it inapplicable because of the defendant's waiver. In Pope v. United States,4 Judge (now Justice)
Blackmun, writing for the Eighth Circuit, held that by raising an
insanity defense and introducing psychiatric testimony to support
it, the defendant had waived his right to object to a court-compelled examination." The usual justification for the waiver theory
is the need to preserve a fair balance between the state and the
individual as adversaries in the criminal justice process.51
In United States v. Cohen,5 the Fifth Circuit commented that
"the government will seldom have a satisfactory method of meeting the defendant's proof on the issue of sanity except by the testimony of a psychiatrist it selects. . . who has had the opportunity
to form a reliable opinion by examining the accused." 3 There, as
in other cases, the courts have found that the prosecution's need
for a chance to rebut an insanity or incompetency defense outweighed any harm the defendant might suffer in undergoing an examination by a psychiatrist chosen by the prosecution." In addimonial or*communicative nature." 384 U.S. at 761.
45. Id.
46. United States v. Weiser, 428 F.2d 932, 936 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Baird,
414 F.2d 700, 708-09 (2d Cir. 1969); State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 9, 210 A.2d 763, 771 (1965).
47. 602 F.2d at 704.
48. See notes 38& 39 supra.
49. 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967).
50. Id. at 721.
51. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964); United States v. Cohen,
530 F.2d 43, 47 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 724 (4th Cir. 1968);
State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763, 775 (1965).
52. 530 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1976).
53. Id. at 48.
54. See United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 724-25 (4th Cir. 1968) (a lengthy per-
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tion, such a procedure would not involve self-incrimination, the
court in Cohen said, because statutory provisions bar the prosecution from using statements made by the defendant during the examination at trial on the question of his guilt."
In Smith v. Estelle, the Fifth Circuit faced a fifth amendment
challenge to a very different use of psychiatric testimony: the diagnosis of future dangerousness for imposition of the death penalty.
Yet the court applied both the evidentiary and the waiver theories
to uphold, rather than overturn, Smith's challenge. First, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that Dr. Grigson's diagnosis that Smith was a
severe sociopath was based on "comments Smith made or failed to
make while he was recounting the crime" 56 during the competency
examination. The court reasoned that the diagnosis did not draw
from Smith's physical mannerisms or behavior during the examination. Thus, the basis of the psychiatrist's conclusions was testimonial, not real or physical evidence, and fell within the ambit of
fifth amendment protection. 7 Then, analogizing from United
States v. Cohen, the court concluded that a defendant presumptively possesses a fifth amendment right to refuse a psychiatric examination if his statements made during the examination may be
used to sentence him to death. 58 Since Smith had never raised any
psychiatric issue nor sought to use psychiatric testimony to show
that he would not be dangerous in the future, he had never waived
his right to refuse the examination or to object to its use at sentencing. Dr. Grigson's examination had taken place only because of
the zeal of the trial judge to ensure that all capital defendants in
his court were competent to stand trial. 59 The prosecution had not
needed Dr. Grigson's testimony to rebut anything because Smith
had never introduced psychiatric testimony. Although such testisonal interview is the only effective means of ascertaining sanity); see, e.g., 530 F.2d at 4748. But see Note, supra note 38, at 670-71 (suggesting that lay evidence gathered by the
state may often be effective in rebutting a defendant's psychiatric defense).
55. 530 F.2d at 47. FED. R. CraM. P. 12.2(c) provides that: "No statement made by the

accused in the course of any examination provided for by this rule, whether the examination
shall be with or without consent of the accused, shall be admitted in evidence against the

accused on the issue of guilt in any criminal proceeding."
18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1976) provides that: "No statement made by the accused in the course
of any examination into his sanity or mental competency provided for by this section,
whether the examination shall be with or without consent of the accused, shall be admitted
in evidence against the accused on the issue of guilt in any criminal proceeding."

56. 602 F.2d at 704.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 705, 708.
59. 445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
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mony would surely aid the prosecution in securing the death penalty, the cost to the defendant was excessive and the balance
weighed in favor of the accused. 60
Having found that fifth amendment protections do attach to
compelled psychiatric examinations, the Fifth Circuit easily devised the appropriate protective procedures. Relying on Miranda
v. Arizona,6 the court reasoned that since a defendant in custody
might too easily confide in a psychiatrist-believing that the doctor would be sympathetic to him and not act as a paid state witness-he must be advised of his right to remain silent. 2 Furthermore, if the defendant could refuse to submit to the examination
in the first place, then he could stop the examination at any
point." The Fifth Circuit rejected Smith's claim of a sixth amendment right to counsel during the examination, but recognized that
a defendant's decision to submit to a psychiatric evaluation of his
future dangerousness is critical, "literally a life or death matter."
Therefore, the court held that the defendant had a right to the
assistance of counsel in reaching that decision.'"
The flaw in the Fifth Circuit's analysis-on both the due process and the fifth amendment questions-is that in its determination to do justice to Ernest Benjamin Smith, the court did not rigorously consider the ramifications of its holdings. The judges were
understandably sympathetic to Smith's plight. He had no substantial prior criminal record," had not actually killed anyone, and yet
was condemned to die on the basis of psychiatric testimony that
the court intimated may have been little better than "quackery. ' 7
Nevertheless, the court should have more fully examined the prin60. 602 F.2d at 704.
61. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

62. 602 F.2d at 708.
63. Id. at 709.

64. Id. at 708.
65. Id. The Fifth Circuit's rejection of the claim that the defendant had a right to have
counsel present during the psychiatric examination echoes several earlier decisions in the

circuit courts. The Fifth Circuit adopted the rationale usually given, that counsel could
probably contribute only slight protection to his client and could potentially disrupt the
examination. See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43, 48 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Trapnell, 495 F.2d 22, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1974); Thornton v. Corcoran, 407 F.2d 695,

702 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 726 (4th Cir. 1968).
One commentator has suggested a different approach-to permit defense counsel to at-

tend the examination solely as a passive observer. In that role, the commentator argued, the
attorney would serve more as a watchdog than as an advocate. Aronson, supra note 38, at
91.

66. 602 F.2d at 699 n.7.
67. Id.
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ciples underlying its holdings.
The court's due process rationale for dismissing Smith's sentence, the unfair surprise engineered by the state, appears theoretically sound. At first glance, the analogy between the devastating
and unfair surprise in Smith and the secrecy in Gardner seems
convincing. In Gardner, however, the defendant had no opportunity to rebut the secret evidence upon which he was sentenced to
death. The surprise in Smith made it difficult for the defense
counsel to rebut effectively, but it did not make the task impossible. There is a qualitative difference between secreting critical evidence from the defense counsel, thus denying the defense any opportunity to rebut, and placing a surprise witness on the stand. In
the latter instance defense counsel will have an opportunity to
move for a continuance, to develop an effective cross-examination.
The Fifth Circuit, however, understandably refused to stake the
defendant's life on his attorneys' failure to delay: "[W]e should be
prepared to excuse the defense attorneys' procedural default in order to avoid a 'miscarriage of justice.'""
In failing to discuss this significant distinction between Smith
and Gardner, the Fifth Circuit never fully developed an explicit
standard of review. The court's emphasis on the state's secretive
conduct barely hints at a standard for determining whether
prosecutorial tactics have been so unfair and prejudicial that they
invalidate a sentence of death. In an adversary proceeding each
side will naturally employ stratagems and tactics. But when the
state intentionally withholds its psychiatrist's name from its witness list"9 to force defense counsel to cross-examine the witness
while unprepared, the state carries such strategic behavior to an
unacceptable extreme. 0
Similarly, the court's holding that there is a fifth amendment
right to refuse a compelled psychiatric examination is somewhat
problematical. The court legitimately concludes that when the defendant's words might send him to his death, there should indeed
be fifth amendment protection for those words. Yet the court
never draws a distinct line between psychiatric examinations on
sanity or competency and those on predicting future dangerousness. Any psychiatric evaluation may consider the defendant's demeanor as well as his statements. Just as Dr. Grigson in this case
68. Id. at 701 n.8 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977)).
69. Id. at 702-03.
70. Id. at 703.
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relied on Smith's statements and silence7 1 to infer future dangerousness, another psychiatrist might have used only mannerisms
and silence to draw the same conclusion. Finally, the Fifth Circuit
never seriously examined the justifications for applying the fifth
amendment when the question of guilt or innocence is no longer at
issue.
Perhaps the most satisfactory way of resolving the questions
raised by the Fifth Circuit's opinion lies in analyzing the approaches the Supreme Court may take in its review. Smith will
mark the first time the Supreme Court reviews the manner in
which Texas has applied the death penalty statute upheld by the
Court four years ago in Jurek v. Texas. At that time the Court
believed that the question of dangerousness under the Texas death
penalty statute would permit a fair hearing of evidence on both
mitigating and aggravating circumstances relevant to the question
of life or death. In setting sentences and granting probation, the
criminal justice system often faces the problem of predicting future behavior; the Court reasoned that determining the defendant's future dangerousness would therefore not be an impossible
task. That determination, however, must be tempered by the concern expressed in Gardner, that due process guarantees must be
strictly enforced in the sentencing of death.
The Supreme Court may well adopt the Fifth Circuit's due
process rationale and hold that the state cannot use psychiatric
predictions of a defendant's future dangerousness if it acquired
and introduced this evidence without fair notice to the defense.
Such a holding would be consistent with the spirit of Gardner.Reliance on the due process holding alone, however, places the Court
in the unenviable position of either devising a workable standard
for delineating unconstitutional prosecutorial tactics or facing a
likely flood of due process challenges to the death penalty.
The Court probably will dodge the broader fifth amendment
challenge, although that course of action would be deplorable.
When the Court struck down the death penalty in Furman it did
so primarily because capital sentencing had become an arbitrary
and unfair procedure.73 In subsequently allowing the states once
again to put criminals to death, the Court claimed that the redrafted statutes had the necessary safeguards to ensure constitu71. Dr. Grigson based his diagnosis both on what Smith said and what he did not say.
602 F.2d at 704.
72. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
73. 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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tionally mandated fairness.7 4 In Jurek, the Court specifically .approved the somewhat vague standard of future dangerousness set
out in the Texas death penalty statute and expressed confidence
that the statute would be applied fairly.75 The rather checkered
recent history of the use of psychiatric testimony in Texas squarely
belies that confidence. 7 For the Court to rely solely on the procedural element of surprise in Smith and ignore the more fundamental fifth amendment question raised by the use of compelled
psychiatric examinations in death penalty sentencing would invite
a return to the unjust morass of pre-Furman death sentencing.
LORI WEINER

74. See cases cited note 16 supra.
75. 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976).
76. See notes 31-33 supra.

